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INTRODUCTION
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2007 general 
elections in Turkey by a large margin and became the first party since the 
1980s to increase its votes in two consecutive elections while in power (1). 
Although the elections were held in a highly tense political climate arising 
from controversy surrounding the presidential elections (Bacik, 2008), the 
results came as no surprise to many and received far less attention in the 
media, academia and public compared to the previous elections held in 
2002. The exceptionally low turnout rate of 59.3%, as opposed to 84.3% 
in 2002, is one of the obvious indications of low public interest in the 
elections.
Looking backwards, many would agree now that it was the 2002 elections 
that represented the major turn in Turkish politics. There are a number of 
factors that make these elections unique. The first is certainly the victory 
of a party described by many as “Islamist-leaning” (Kanra, 2005, 515) or 
representing “moderate political Islam” (Çaha, 2003). The victory of AKP, 
which had been established merely 15 months before the elections and 
whose president had been in jail some time ago for publicly reciting a 
poem, took almost everyone by surprise, even those who were accustomed 
to the ups and downs of politics in Turkey. Described as a “political 
earthquake” (Gruen, 2003) and even as a “tsunami” (Özel, 2003), the 
impacts of the 2002 elections on society are indeed comparable to the year 
1950 when the three-decade single-party rule came to an end or to the year 
1980 when both the coup d’etat and liberal turn of the economy took place. 
The ascent to power of a party whose origins were undeniably connected 
with the politicization of Islam attracted worldwide attention and brought 
to the fore some burning questions on the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy in the post 9/11 world (2).
It was not only the victory of a party rooted in Islamist movement in a 
country that had “a longer history of secularism than any other Muslim 
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country” (hermann, 2003, 266) that made these elections unique. All the 
parties represented in the parliament, either in power or in opposition, 
in the previous 1999 elections failed to pass the national threshold. All 
the parties that took part in the governing three-party coalition, and the 
opposition party, all representing the well-established traditions in Turkish 
politics and all of which had been major actors of the political arena after 
the 1980 military takeover, saw humiliating defeat and remained seatless 
in the parliament. Contributing to the bizarreness of the election was the 
unexpected 7.2% of votes received by the Young Party (GP), a new party 
with no clear political identity (Bacik, 2004), led by a notorious business 
tycoon, careful to dissociate himself from any established political tradition. 
Furthermore, the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (DehAP) 
received an all-time high of 6.2% of votes. 
Surprising though they certainly were as far as the established political 
balances are concerned, the results of 2002 elections once again proved the 
persistence of the well-known geographical pattern of voting in Turkey. 
This pattern made itself visible, put very briefly, with concentrations 
of liberal and social democrat parties in western regions, nationalist 
parties in the centre, Islamist and conservative parties in the east and 
pro-Kurdish party in the south east (3). The unevenness of spatial voting 
patterns in Turkey has been well studied and documented in connection 
with the 2002 and previous elections (Çarkoğlu, 2000; West, 2005). This 
paper is structured around the objective of going beyond the mere task of 
documenting the spatial unevenness of party votes and to unearth, with 
the aid of geographically weighted regression (GWR) technique, the very 
reasons that may account for why a particular political party received the 
percentage of votes it did in a particular locality in the 2002 elections. In 
other words, this is not an article about the geography of voting in Turkey, 
but about the geography of factors that make political parties’ votes differ 
from one region to another.
Using the district level results of the 2002 elections, we develop a model 
that could explain the reasons behind this uneven spatial pattern of voting. 
With this aim we build a two-stage regression model, one global and one 
local. We start with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to 
unravel the nation-wide cause-effect relationships between party votes and 
a number of social and economic indicators. In the next stage, we develop 
a GWR model with the same variables in an attempt to take into account 
the spatially changing (contingent) relationships between party votes and 
independent variables. Allowing the parameters of a regression equation 
to change locally, GWR depends on the understanding that the very same 
cause may lead to a different effect in a different context. It is therefore 
the contextual nature of interaction between a set of variables that GWR 
tries to uncover. Formulated from another perspective, what we wish to 
do in this paper is to show that there exist in Turkey, as far as party votes 
are concerned, regions differentiated from each other not only in terms of 
the percentage of votes received by each party, but also with regard to the 
determinants of party preferences in each locality. 
In the section that follows we discuss the 2002 elections and make brief 
remarks about the political parties we enquire in the paper. The third 
section is devoted to data considerations and building the OlS model. here 
we introduce the variables we use in the GWR model. The section that 
follows comprises the GWR model and the implications that it brings to the 
fore. In the final section of the paper, we discuss the conclusions flowing 
out of the analysis we make. 
3. For an analysis of the geography of 2002 
and previous elections at the national level, 
Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, (2006a). See also Işık 
and Pınarcoğlu (2006c) for the analysis 2002 
elections in the case of Ankara.
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2002 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES:     
A BRIEF BACKGROUND
The origins of the rupture that Turkish politics witnessed in the 2002 
elections can indeed be traced back to another “earthquake/tsunami”, the 
1980 military coup when the then-existing parties were all banned. When 
the elections were held in 1983, the Turkish political arena had taken a new 
course with entirely new agents. Advocating a hybrid program combining 
the elements of liberal and conservative discourses that best fitted the 
needs of a country that had left behind its long established tradition of 
import substitution, Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party won two successive 
elections in the 1980s and left its imprint in the post-1980 reconstruction 
process. Özal’s market-based conservative discourse not only opened up 
Turkish economy to global competition and thus fatally disturbing the 
political equations that had been geared to the maintenance of inward-
oriented economic structures, but also heavily influenced the discourses of 
almost all the parties set up afterwards (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002).
On the other hand, the left that had a long tradition of establishing its main 
discourse with reference to the allegations that the Republic was under a 
never-ending threat, failed to go beyond its elitist attitudes and managed 
to be the advocate of neither the pioneers nor the victims of globalization 
processes. The left, represented in the 1990s by various political parties, 
maintained its traditional attitude vis-à-vis the market and, with the impact 
of a crude statist discourse, could not voice the needs of large popular 
masses feeling the burdens of new economic policies. With their hesitancy 
against the European Union and a political attitude that eventually led 
to nationalism not different from that of traditional nationalist parties, 
they failed to gather the votes of both traditional leftist sections and the 
nationalist sections of the society (Açıkel, 2003; Bacik, 2004; Başkan, 2005).
The 1990s also witnessed the gradual rise of Islamist movement, managing 
in a variety of ways to become the voice of those sections of the society that 
had been victimized by the globalization processes and the new economic 
policies. Formulating their ideological stance as a reaction to the state-led 
modernization, and thus to the “institutionalization of a state-interpreted, 
official version of Islam” (Buğra, 2002, 189), they registered surprisingly 
high percentages of votes among the urban poor and the nascent 
bourgeoisie referred to as the “Anatolian Tigers” developing in the new 
centers outside İstanbul. 
Another equally important characteristic of the 1990s is the inability on the 
part of established political traditions to formulate policies and programs 
that would appeal those living in the deprived south-eastern regions. As 
a consequence of the failure of mainstream parties, a locally strong pro-
Kurdish left-wing party received a considerable share of the votes cast in 
the region. As the Kurdish left oscillated between the strategy of adopting 
a political-democratic path and the strategy of remaining in the shadow of 
separatist discourse, the rift between the Turkish and Kurdish left became 
deeper (Açıkel, 2003, 200). 
Given the apparent inability of existing parties to deal with the 2001 crisis 
and corruption, the 2002 elections took place at a time when the public was 
in search of novel political ideas. The results, given in Table 1 alongside 
the 2007 elections, testified to the opening up of a new era for Turkish 
politics with new political parties and agents. In our attempt to reveal the 
local determinants of party votes, we analyze in this paper four of these 
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parties: AKP, ChP, MhP and DehAP (represented in the 2007 elections 
by independent candidates) and ignore DYP and GP, not only because 
they lost considerable ground from 2002 to 2007 but also they ceased to be 
important agents in current Turkish politics. 
The main characteristics of the parties analyzed herein can be summarized 
briefly as follows:
AKP- Justice and Development Party
Following the closure by the Constitutional Court of a series of Islamist 
parties that had been set up since the 1970s and most importantly the 
ultimatum given by the military in 1997 to the coalition government, Justice 
and Development Party was set up in 2001 by the relatively young and 
moderate cadres of the Islamist movement of the 1990s. Although most of 
the principles of the new party were borrowed from the previous Islamist 
movements, the AKP leadership carefully dissociated themselves from the 
previous hard-liner tradition and adopted a pragmatist attitude and “a 
problem-solving approach which [had] grown out of the local government 
experiences of the leadership cadre” (Doğan, 2005, 430). Breaking with the 
long-established anti-European sentiment of traditional Islam and defining 
themselves as “conservative democrat”, they adopted a conservative 
attitude in the social arena and a liberal attitude towards the market (Coşar 
and Özman, 2004; Özbudun, 2006). They gained widespread support from 
those who were discontent with the existing order, especially the lower-
middle-class state bureaucrats and the unskilled urban poor that were 
victimized by the waves of globalization and the small and medium sized 
traders and manufacturers especially in the rapidly developing provincial 
towns of Anatolia (İnsel, 2003). Given the obvious Islamist background 
of their leaders and the newly adopted notion of conservative-liberalism, 
some regard AKP as a “post-Islamist movement” (Dağı, 2005). The party 
came to power in the 2002 elections at a time when the parties ruling 
Turkey were incapable of dealing with the 2001 crisis and “enmeshed by a 
web of corruption and incompetence” (hale, 2005, 304). 
CHP- Republican People’s Party
established in the 1920s by the Republican elite, ChP is the oldest and 
the largest centre-left party in Turkey. Advocating a radical and militant 
interpretation of the principles laid down in the early Republican period, 
among which secularism, populism and statism are the most important 
ones, the party experienced its heyday in the 1977 elections when it 
received more than 40% of votes.  Failing to adapt itself to the changing 
circumstances of the 1980s and 1990s, ChP lost its traditional working 
class electoral base and offered very little to the large masses mobilized by 
the Islamic movement of the 1990s. As the crisis of the centre-left became 
chronic, the party oscillated between traditional statism, populism and 
neo-liberalism (Açıkel, 2003), but in no case gave up defending a very 
 AKP ChP DYP MhP GP DehAP Independents Other
2002 elections
• Percentage of votes 34.3 19.4 9.6 8.3 7.2 6.2 1.0 14.0
• Seats in Parliament 363 179 - - - - 8 -
2007 elections
• Percentage of votes 46.5 20.8 5.4 14.3 3.0 - 5.2 4.8
• Seats in Parliament 341 112 - 71 - - 26 -
Table 1. Party votes in 2002 and 2007 
elections (TurkStat, 2002 and 2007 election 
results)
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orthodox and vulgar version of secularism, thus aiming to be the voice of 
the discontents of Islamic resurgence. Representing high elitism in Turkish 
political life (Bacik, 2004), ChP had its worst days in 1999 when it failed to 
pass the 10% national threshold and remained outside the parliament for 
the first time in its history. especially after the 2001 crisis ChP increasingly 
came to defend a nationalistic discourse, manifesting itself in an irresolute 
attitude towards the EU. 
MHP- Nationalist Action Party
MhP is an ultra nationalist party regarded by many as a pan-Turkist 
party “modeled on Russian pan-Slavism and emphasizing the unity of 
Turkic peoples throughout the Middle East and Central Asia” (Secor, 
2001, 540). Under the cold-war conditions of the 1970s the party became 
the audacious voice of anti-communist sentiments, with a strong rural 
background. Its supporters took active part in the street fights and were 
held responsible for the killings of many left-wing figures in the late 
1970s. MhP adapted itself to the changing circumstances of the post-cold 
war world by replacing its anti-communist ideology with one based on a 
militant hostility against the European Union and the Kurdish separatist 
movement in the Southeast. After the death of its legendary chairman 
Alpaslan Türkeş in 1997, the party leadership took a decisive turn and tried 
hard to get rid of the street-gang and rural image of the party. In the 1999 
elections the party became the second party for the first time in its history, 
managing to receive a considerable support among the urban electorate 
(Çınar and Arıkan, 2002) especially in cities attracting Kurdish migrants. 
With the rise of AKP, however, the party lost ground and failed to pass 
the 10% threshold in the 2002 elections, largely due to its “ambivalent and 
inconsistent position vis-a-vis the conservative Islamic electorate” (Açıkel, 
2003, 197).
DEHAP- People’s Democracy Party
DehAP is a pro-Kurdish party exceptionally strong in the south-eastern 
regions of Turkey, the traditional Kurdish area. Although the origins of 
the Kurdish problem and the underdevelopment of the region date back 
to the early Republican period and even to the Ottoman Empire, the rise 
of a political movement claiming to represent the Kurdish minority must 
be seen as a direct consequence of mounting tension and armed conflict 
between the government forces and the separatist PKK since the late 
1980s. As the party leadership never set a distance between the party and 
the PKK, some regard DehAP as “the political outlet of PKK” (Yavuz 
and Özcan, 2006). With the growing Kurdish nationalism, DehAP (and 
a number of other parties set up before and after it, after Constitutional 
Court had either closed or threatened to close political parties based on 
ethnicity) emerged out of the obvious failure in the southeast region of 
the parties representing the established traditions in Turkish politics. 
Although it found some but limited support among the Kurdish migrants 
in metropolitan areas, DehAP remained largely as a regional party, solely 
voicing the identity of Kurds in the region and failing to draw up a general 
program for the wider electorate. Managing to become the first party in 
12 provinces of the region in 2002 elections, DehAP’s dominance in the 
region is still largely unchallenged. 
The dependent variables used in both OLS and GWR models –percentage 
of votes received by these four parties in districts in the 2002 elections- are 
shown in Figure 1 by quintiles. As the maps make it clear the votes of the 
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four parties tend in varying degrees to concentrate in particular regions: 
AKP votes in a strip running parallel to the north coast, ChP votes in 
western provinces, MhP parts of central Turkey and south coast and 
DehAP in the east and southeast. The map for AKP also shows the three 
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of party votes 
in 2002 elections by quintile ranges.
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largest metropolitan areas of Turkey (İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir) where 
nearly one thirds of the electorate live. As our main concern in this paper is 
to reveal the reasons behind the uneven pattern of voting, we now turn to 
the discussion of our OLS model and introduce the independent variables.  
DATA and OLS
As we discussed in the preceding section the dependent variables we use in 
our analysis are the percentages of votes received by the four parties in the 
2002 elections in districts. The dataset we used for independent variables 
consists of the results of the 2000 population census for 923 districts, except 
the gross domestic product (GDP) variable calculated by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) through national income studies and 
household consumption and income surveys. We used six independent 
variables to explain the district-wise variability of party votes. Instead 
of using single indicators we produced composite indices comprising a 
multitude of variables, except once again for the GDP variable. The spatial 
distribution of the six independent variables is given in Figure 2. 
We attempt to explain local variations in party votes with the help of 
following variables:
(1) GDP (top left map in Figure 2) Per capita gross domestic product in 
districts in US dollars. This is the figure calculated by TURKSAT firstly in 
1996 through a production-based methodology. This figure was updated 
later for the year 2000. As is clear on the map, the distribution of the GDP 
variable reproduces the well-known picture that also becomes visible in 
many other variables: The dichotomy between the affluent west and the 
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of independent 
variables by quintile ranges.
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deprived east, where the districts in the centre represent an in-between 
case.
(2) Gender index (top right map in Figure 2) The gender index we have 
developed to explain the local variability in party votes is comprised of 
two indicators (4): Female literacy rate and female participation in non-
agricultural labor force. While the overall literacy rate in 2000 among the 
population aged 6+ is 87.3%, it drops to 80.6% in the case of females. It 
is interesting to see that female literacy rate exhibits a striking variability 
among the districts with a maximum of 96.3% and a minimum of 30.1%. 
The second indicator included in the gender index -female participation 
in non-agricultural workforce- in Turkey has been exceptionally low 
and changed very slowly over the years. In the year 2000, out of a total 
of 13.4 million people working in non-agricultural sectors, only 11.7% 
are women. With a rapid increase in working age population coinciding 
with a structural transformation away from labor-intensive agriculture 
towards industry and services, women have found it increasingly difficult 
to find a place for themselves in the urban labor market due to low level of 
educational attainment (World Bank, 2006). 
The higher levels of the gender index denote the cases where women are 
better educated and more active in non-agricultural sectors. Close-to-zero 
levels of the index, therefore, refer to the opposite cases. The top right map 
in Figure 2 shows that this index is high western districts along the Aegean 
Sea and the Mediterranean. The map also reveals once again the harsh 
conditions faced by women in the eastern and south-eastern regions.
(3) Education index (middle left map in Figure 2) having introduced 
the basic concepts related to the design of the indices, we can now move 
faster in our discussion of the independent variables. The education index 
comprises adult literacy rate, the percentage of university graduates and 
the difference between male and female literacy rates. The higher the 
education index, the more educated the settlement in question is. On the 
contrary, the low levels of the education index refer to the cases where the 
population is less educated and there is a considerable gap between male 
and female literacy rates. The relevant map in Figure-2 depicts a picture 
very similar to previous maps and reveals the huge gap between western 
and eastern regions in terms of education-related variables.
(4) Demography index (middle right map in Figure 2) The demography 
index is composed of three variables: Average household size, child 
woman ratio as a measure of recent fertility (the number of children under 
age 5 per 1000 women of reproductive age) and the dependency ratio (the 
ratio of dependent population, i.e. population aged 0-15 and 65+, to the 
economically active population, i.e. population aged 15-64). The low levels 
of demography index refer to those settlements where the fertility rate is 
low, average household size is small, i.e. to those where population has 
become more or less stabilized. Where the demography index is high, the 
percentage of young population and the rate of fertility are high. Viewed 
in terms of the famous demographic transition theory, the settlements with 
lower values of demography index are those that are about to complete 
their demographic transition process, while those with high values are 
in the earlier stages of the demographic transition. The map reproduces, 
in the case of demographic variables, the well-known general pattern of 
regional inequalities in Turkey (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2006b). 
4. While calculating the indices we used for 
the OLS and GWR models, we normalised 
the variables using the simple formula 
(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin), where xi represents the 
value of the indicator in question in district 
“i” while xmax and xmin are respectively the 
maximum and minimum values of the same 
indicator in Turkey. We then added these 
normalised values and simply divided the 
sum by the number of indicators, without 
assigning any weight to the indicators. 
Because of this calculation method all the 
indices we developed have a value between 
0 and 1. 
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(5) Economic activity index (bottom left map in Figure 2) This index 
designed to measure the diversity of economic activities in a given 
settlement includes four variables: The share in total working population 
of those working (a) as entrepreneurs and high level directors; (b) in 
manufacturing industry; (c) in agriculture, and (d) in finance, insurance 
and real-estate sector. This index is actually designed to understand 
the part played by agriculture and non-agricultural activities in a given 
settlement. The higher the economic activity index, the lower the level 
of agriculture and the higher the percentage of those in non-agricultural 
activities. It is interesting to note that the map in Figure 2 does not have an 
easily discernible pattern. In addition to a milder east-west differentiation 
compared to previous maps, province centers do emerge as important 
poles of economic activity in each case.
(6) Urban development index (bottom right map in Figure 2) Designed to 
measure the pace of urbanization in a given settlement, urban development 
index is composed of two indicators: The percentage of urban population 
and the annual growth rate of urban population. The higher the urban 
development index in a given settlement, the more urbanized the district 
and/or the higher the population growth is. 
The results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis made with 
the above variables are given in Table 2 which also contains some 
information about the results of the GWR analysis to be discussed in the 
following section. As can be seen in the Table, the explanatory power of the 
Dependent variables
Parameters AKP CHP MHP DEHAP
Constant Unstandardized coefficient 23.89 15.90 1.55 9.86
Global t value 4.32** 4.82** 0.77 2.91**
GDP Unstandardized coefficient -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0006
Standardized coefficient -0.233 0.082 -0.068 0.092
Global t value -5.31** 2.06* -1.62 2.87**
Gender Unstandardized coefficient -47.18 10.04 -2.75 1.21
Standardized coefficient -0.4496 0.1455 -0.0692 0.0137
Global t value -5.81** 2.08* -0.93 0.24
Education Unstandardized coefficient 71.45 5.94 22.31 -48.57
Standardized coefficient 0.5453 0.0690 0.4497 -0.4412
Global t value 6.69** 1.96* 5.71** -7.44**
Demography Unstandardized coefficient -6.26 -14.64 -2.79 41.16
Standardized coefficient -0.0627 -0.2233 -0.0739 0.4915
Global t value -1.06 -4.15** -1.29 11.36**
Economy Unstandardized coefficient 6.87 9.55 -19.33 26.04
Standardized coefficient 0.0592 0.1252 -0.4403 0.2674
Global t value 1.04 2.42* -7.98** 6.44**
Urban Unstandardized coefficient 2.29 -14.14 5.11 8.93
Standardized coefficient 0.0179 -0.1689 0.1059 0.0834
Global t value 0.38 -3.98** 2.34 2.45*
F value 13.93 50.47 25.55 161.52
OLS- Adjusted R square 0.078 0.244 0.138 0.511
GWR adjusted R square 0.729 0.607 0.464 0.755
Number of observations: 923
* Significant at p<= 0.05
** Significant at p<= 0.01
Table 2. Ordinary least squares 
regression results.
Oğuz IŞIK and M. Melİh PINARCIOğlu170 METU JFA 2010/1
independent variables is usually very low, except for DehAP for which 
R2 is the highest (0.51). For other parties, the R2 values vary between 0.08 
for AKP and 0.24 for ChP and 0.14 for MhP. In general, however, the OlS 
model does not seem to be capable of explaining the global reasons behind 
the different percentages of votes received by parties.
There are, however, some details concerning the relationship between 
particular party votes and some variables. It is, for instance, interesting to 
note that there exists a positive and highly significant relationship between 
AKP votes and education, while the relationship is reversed in the case of 
GDP and the gender index. hence the higher the level of education and 
the lower the income and women’s participation in economic life, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the percentage of AKP votes in a given settlement. 
Restricting our observations only to those relations that are statistically 
highly significant, we see that ChP votes are negatively related with 
demography and urban indices. Of the relationships revealed by the OLS 
analysis, the one that is the easiest to interpret is the case of DehAP, in 
which the coefficient of determination is much higher than that of other 
parties. DehAP votes are positively correlated with the demography 
index, meaning that this party finds its popular support in areas where 
fertility is high. On the other hand, there exists a highly significant negative 
relationship between DehAP and education referring to the fact that 
DehAP tends to be stronger, ceteris paribus, where the level of education 
is low. In the next section we analyze, with the aid of GWR, how these 
relations change from one district to another and find out that there are 
numerous differences that remain hidden in the global analysis. 
GWR Model
Allowing the parameters of a regression equation to chance locally, 
geographically weighted regression technique is an effort to open up 
room for spatial heterogeneity in geographical research. Based on the 
understanding that the very same cause may lead to a different effect in a 
different setting, GWR acknowledges the fact that the global (necessary) 
relations unearthed in the OLS model may not work in a particular 
locality where spatially changing (contingent) impacts of independent 
variables may lead to an entirely different outcome. It is thus the context-
dependent nature of social interaction that GWR takes into account. As a 
technique of spatial analysis GWR was initially formulated and developed 
by Fotheringham, Brundson and Charlton (see Brundson, Fotheringham 
and Charlton, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000). Since then it has become one of 
the most widely used techniques of spatial econometrics with increasing 
applications in a variety of fields including regional studies (Bivand and 
Brunstad, 2002), environmental studies (Platt, 2004), political geography 
(Calvo and escolar, 2003) and demography (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2006b). 
In the GWR analysis, one of the observations is selected as the reference 
point and all other observations are weighted according to a decreasing 
function of distance from the reference. having calculated the parameters 
of estimation for the reference point, these calculations are repeated 
for all observations in the dataset (4). The result is a series of mappable 
coefficients (including regression coefficients, t-values and coefficients of 
determination) showing the various aspects of the local relation between 
dependent and independent variables. This, indeed, refers to the most 
difficult task faced by the analysts using GWR- the difficulty of interpreting 
the results as there are many outputs of the model. In our case for 
instance, assuming that we wish to map regression coefficients, t-values 4. For further notes on the mathematics of the GWR model, see Fotheringham et al. 2002. 
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and coefficients of determination and considering that we have used 4 
independent and 6 dependent variables, this means that 3x4x6=72 maps 
can be produced for 923 districts. In this study we preferred, following 
Farrow et al. (2005), to interpret the results with the help of local t-values 
showing the significance of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables (6). Furthermore, instead of trying to explain all the 
variables for all political parties, we preferred to carry out a variable-wise 
analysis for a number of, rather than all, variables which seemed to be of 
importance for most of the parties. 
Before discussing the GWR results, we should add a few words as to the 
contribution it has made to our understanding the relationship between 
party votes and independent variables. In Table 2 where the OLS results 
are summarized the contribution of the GWR can easily be seen. The results 
obtained indicate that GWR significantly improved the OLS results with R2 
values increasing in every case, the highest being the case of AKP from 0.08 
to a fairly well level of 0.73. 
The first variable we wish to consider is the education index. Figure 3 
shows the relationship between education and party votes at the local 
level. The most important point that becomes visible in Figure 3 is the 
relationship between AKP votes and the education index. Although the 
analysis at the national level revealed the existence of a highly significant 
positive relationship between AKP votes and the education index, the 
GWR results make it clear that this relationship is highly variable in 
space. Not only does the significance of the relationship between AKP and 
education change considerably from one district to another, but also the 
direction of this relationship is reversed in many cases. It may be observed 
from the top left map in Figure 3 that this global relationship between 
AKP and education holds true only for a limited number of districts 
clustered into four groups in different parts of the country. These are the 
districts where AKP has found itself a popular base among the better 
educated. There are, however, major and very interesting exceptions to this 
relationship. The GWR analysis reveals that there are a number of districts 
where there is a reversed relationship between AKP and the educated. In a 
wide area stretching from Istanbul to Izmir in the west and covering most 
of Ankara in the centre, AKP has an entirely different relationship between 
the education index. In all these districts including the three largest 
metropolitan areas of Turkey, there is a significant negative relationship 
between AKP votes and the level of education, meaning that the higher 
the level of education, the lower the AKP votes. Put conversely, the lower 
the level of education, the higher the AKP votes in metropolitan areas, a 
finding that refers to the popularity of AKP among the urban poor. 
The map concerning the local relationship between ChP and the education 
index (second from top in Figure 3) tells an entirely different story. This 
map is almost a flawless negative of the one for AKP. The significant 
positive correlation between ChP and education at the global level seems 
to be valid only for those areas where education is negatively correlated 
with AKP votes. In metropolitan areas comprising a major portion of the 
votes cast in Turkey, AKP and ChP have constituted different relationships 
between the educated- ChP doing well among the better educated and 
AKP performing better among the less educated (7). As far as the largest 
metropolitan areas are concerned, this means that the two leading parties 
have different social bases. Of the other maps in Figure 3, the one that 
deserves attention is that for DehAP (bottom map). The highly significant 
6. In this study we used GWR 3.0 software 
developed by Fotheringham and his co-
workers.
7. The analysis we carried out in the case 
of Ankara for the 2002 elections provides 
support to this result. The results showed 
that AKP was stronger in the northern parts 
where the level of education is low. On the 
contrary, ChP did considerably better in the 
southern parts of the city where the better-off 
live.
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negative relationship discovered in the global analysis is valid only for the 
eastern and south-eastern districts where DehAP has a strong support 
and where the level of education is considerably low compared to the rest 
of Turkey. This may be regarded as an indication of the fact that DehAP 
owes, at least part of its success in the region, to the low levels of education 
Figure 3. Local relation between education 
index and party performances.
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prevailing in the region. In no other part of Turkey is there a significant 
relationship between the level of education and DehAP votes.
The set of relations between what we referred to as the gender index and 
the party votes is shown in maps of Figure 4. Starting from the top, in 
Figure 4. Local relation between gender 
index and party performances.
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the case of AKP there is a highly significant negative correlation between 
women’s position, meaning that AKP tends to perform better in districts 
where the gender index is lower. As the map shows, the districts where this 
correlation is valid seem to have clustered in four areas: One each in the 
northeast, mid-north, mid-west and a larger area in the south. The global 
relation revealed in the OLS analysis is true only for these districts. Except 
for a few districts in the mid-east region, there exists no significant positive 
relationship between AKP and women’s social position. In the case of ChP, 
the significant positive relationship with the gender index manifests itself 
in four clustered areas, which are more or less the same as those where 
AKP has a strong negative relationship. This means that in districts where 
there is a strong negative correlation between AKP votes and women’s 
position, there is an opposite relationship for ChP. These findings may 
be interpreted, with some degree of caution, as another evidence to the 
fact that both parties have different popular bases. In a given district a 
particular factor that leads to a rise in AKP votes leads directly to a decline 
in ChP votes. The opposite of this argument is also valid: what causes ChP 
votes to increase in particular area leads to a decline in AKP votes in that 
area. 
Looking briefly at the correlation between gender index and other parties, 
the not-too-significant negative relationship between MhP and the gender 
index at the national level turns into highly significant negative one in 
three narrow strips extending from north to south almost without any 
interruption. One can note in Figure 1 that of these three strips the one in 
the middle covers districts where MhP has done particularly well. And 
finally DehAP’s more or less neutral relation at the national level with the 
gender index turns into a strong positive one in the southeast where it has 
the majority of its voters.
For the local relationships between the economic activity index and party 
performances (Figure 5), we could say that the relationship between AKP 
and ChP votes detected in the case of two previous variables holds true 
for this variable as well. In areas where the economic activity index asserts 
a negative impact on AKP votes (in other words, where the weight of 
agriculture and AKP votes change in the same direction), ChP has the 
opposite relationship, or vice versa. Even a cursory examination of the 
maps on the top row of Figure 5 could testify to this fact. On the other 
hand, MhP has a significant negative relationship with the economy index 
in a large proportion of districts in Central Anatolia, which means that 
the share of MhP votes tends to rise as the share of agriculture rises. And 
DehAP displays once again its character as a truly regional party, with the 
highly significant positive impacts of the economy index in the provinces 
of the east and southeast.
In Figure 6 there are local relations between some parties and a number 
of selected variables. The two maps on top show the local relationship 
between AKP and ChP votes and GDP per capita. Although AKP is 
negatively and ChP is positively correlated at the global level with GDP, 
there are many exceptions where a reverse relationship holds. Three of the 
four clusters where AKP votes are positively correlated with GDP contrary 
to the national trend (from left to right Denizli, Kayseri and Gaziantep 
provinces) are those provinces referred to as “Anatolian Tigers” that 
showed unprecedented development during the 1980s and 1990s taking 
advantage of labour intensive exports in the global markets. In those places 
the global relationship between AKP and per capita GDP is reversed, 
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Figure 5. Local relation between economic 
activity index and party performances.
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meaning that the higher the per capita income, the higher the percentage 
of its votes. As for ChP, two clusters of districts, one in the northeast and 
the other in the east, appear as areas where the national trend is reversed. 
In those areas, contrary to the OLS results, the lower the per capita income, 
the higher the percentage of the party’s votes. This means, there are 
some dynamics at work probably peculiar to those areas strong enough 
to reverse the national trends. In fact, one of these dynamics may be the 
fact that these districts (especially those in the east) are known to be the 
traditional living areas of the Alevi population, who as the followers of a 
more heterodox understanding of Islam have historically tended to vote for 
ChP (erman and Göker, 2000; Çarkoğlu, 2005).
As for the local relation between party performances and demography 
index, only DehAP has a very strong positive correlation at the national 
level with demography-related indicators. Though different in magnitude 
and significance, all other parties do have positive correlation with the 
demography index. On the middle row of Figure 6 are the maps showing 
the local relation between demography index and ChP and DehAP votes. 
As far as DehAP is concerned, one could easily observe that this map 
clearly seems to have an entirely different pattern. The highly significant 
positive correlation that exists nationwide between DehAP and the 
demography index is reversed in what is almost the geometric centre 
of an area where DehAP is the strongest. In this particular zone where 
fertility is high and the average household size is higher than the average, 
in short where the demography index is high, this variable exerts negative 
impact on DehAP’s votes. Another interesting point is the fact that this 
Figure 6. Local relation between party per-
formances and selected variables.
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core is almost like an enclave, encircled by districts where there is a strong 
positive relationship between DehAP and demographic variables. The 
situation as to demography is entirely different for ChP (middle left map 
in Figure 6). The negative correlation between ChP votes and demographic 
variables seem to cover a very wide area. Any increase in fertility and 
household size seems to have a negative impact on ChP in a wide area. 
In the case urban development index, there appears an interesting case for 
ChP (bottom right map in Figure 6). This variable, comprising percentage 
of urban population as well population growth rate, exhibits only negative 
correlation with ChP. According to this correlation, an increase in this 
index (in other words, an increase in urban population and population 
growth) might lead to a concomitant decline in ChP votes. It seems in 
the map that this negative relationship is valid especially for two areas 
covering north-east and some parts of eastern Anatolia. It should be noted 
that these areas are characterized by a considerably slow rate of population 
growth largely because of out-migration. The lower values of urban 
development index (namely low levels of urbanization and a slow and 
even a minus growth rate) seems to have exert a positive impact on ChP 
votes. As out-migration rises, so do ChP votes. This could be explained 
with reference to the elderly population, who choose not to migrate and 
who also might have a tradition of supporting ChP. As for MhP, one 
could easily see that the positive, but almost neutral, national relationship 
between its votes and urban index is highly significant in a number of 
districts along the south coast. It must be noted that these are the districts 
that witnessed a massive Kurdish migration from the south-east in recent 
years and where MhP found a strong electoral base among those that are 
discontent with this inflow of Kurdish population. 
CONCLUSIONS
Analyzing the results of 2002 elections with the help of GWR technique, 
we tried in this paper to understand the geography of various factors that 
make political parties’ votes differ from one region to another in a country 
like Turkey characterized by a high level of social and geographical 
inequalities. Specifically this paper analyses the reasons behind the 
spatial heterogeneity of voting patterns in Turkey, shedding light on 
the social and economic determinants of party preferences at the local 
level. As exemplified in several cases above, GWR is a technique capable 
of revealing the local relationships that may remain hidden in a global 
analysis. Even in cases where there is a significant national relationship 
between a particular party’s votes and a set of variables, there are localities 
where some locale-specific factors may be effective upon the significance 
and even reverse the direction of this relationship. 
The following conclusions deserve to be reemphasized in connection with 
the GWR analysis:
1. Sharp contrast between AKP and CHP in terms of local determinants: 
Probably the most important conclusion to be drawn from the above 
analysis is the finding that AKP and ChP, the two leading parties in 
Turkish political arena, seem to have almost entirely opposite relations 
with independent variables. In a given district a particular factor leading 
to a rise in AKP votes leads directly to a decline in ChP votes. This 
cleavage between AKP and ChP is reminiscent of the well-known tension 
between the secular, urban and West-oriented “centre” and religious, 
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agricultural and traditional “periphery”, a tension which for Mardin 
(1973) has been the distinguishing character of Turkish politics since the 
foundation of the Republic and which for many is still the most salient axis 
of political divisions in Turkey (Sayarı, 1978; Özbudun, 1981; Tachau, 1984; 
Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). 
2. The poor neighborhoods of rural migrants in metropolitan areas- new 
areas of the periphery: 
In its classical formulation by Mardin (1973) the “periphery”, equated 
mainly with peasantry, small farmers and artisans, would have a tendency 
to vote for conservative parties and it was believed that right-wing votes 
would rise in line with the rural character of a settlement (Çarkoğlu and 
hinnich, 2006). The GWR analysis, however, makes it clear that this is 
true only for MhP in central parts of the country. On the other hand, this 
is certainly not true for AKP, which seems to represent the traditional 
and religious values associated with the periphery. As evidenced by the 
relationship between AKP votes and economy and urban indices, AKP 
does have a very strong popular base in urban areas. This paradox can be 
explained with reference to the peculiarities of urbanization process that 
Turkey has undergone in the last four decades. The influx of rural migrants 
into urban areas has not brought with itself an atomistic and individualistic 
urban culture as suggested by the classical theories of urbanization but 
been characterized by the predominance of various community-type 
relations organized along the lines of traditional values such as religion 
and ethnicity (Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, 2008). It can thus be claimed that the 
well-known centre-periphery tension has now been transferred to urban 
areas in the guise of a new tension between the well-educated rich and the 
less-educated poor. The fact that AKP has found itself a strong popular 
base among the less educated in metropolitan areas must be regarded as 
evidence to this claim.
It must also be emphasized that the negative significant relationship 
between the education index and AKP votes in metropolitan areas, which 
we regard as the evidence of the new guise of the well-known centre-
periphery tension, did remain hidden in the OLS analysis carried out at 
the national level. Furthermore, the GWR results testified once again to 
the well-known relationship between ChP as the party representing the 
centre and the well-educated segments of the population especially in 
metropolitan areas. 
3. AKP as the party of educated and traditional family life in the central 
and northern Anatolia: 
The picture that emerges in relation to AKP in metropolitan areas is 
somewhat reversed in other parts of the country. Although AKP has a 
popular base among the less-educated poor of urban areas, it seems to have 
either neutral or positive significant relationship with the education index 
in a large number of districts. In a number of clusters located in central and 
northern parts of Turkey AKP does have strong base among the relatively 
educated. however, the fact that AKP votes are negatively correlated with 
the gender index and positively correlated with the demography index and 
the fact that these relations get more significant where AKP is strong show 
us the conservative and Islamist face of the party. As far as its strongholds 
in central and northern Anatolia are concerned, AKP has a wide electoral 
base in places which do not give much role to women in the labor market 
and public sphere. AKP strongholds in central and northern Anatolia are 
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settlements where women are particularly inactive in the labor market 
and fertility is relatively high. It can thus be conferred, albeit indirectly, 
that increasing education and welfare standards especially in settlements 
where AKP is strong has not led to the emancipation of women (Işık and 
Pınarcıoğlu, 2006b).
4. The rising Anatolian Tigers and AKP: 
The GWR analysis as to GDP shows us another interesting point that can 
account for the success of AKP. The clusters of settlements where AKP has 
a strong positive relationship with income consist mainly of places known 
as “Anatolian Tigers” that showed unprecedented success in the 1980s and 
1990s venturing in the global economy. Those provinces were quick on the 
uptake of potentials in the globalization and the places that became the 
venues of entrepreneurship and gained the tag of Anatolian tigers during 
that period. As seen in GDP results, AKP, defending liberal economic 
policies, has significant positive relations with their votes and GDP in those 
places. 
5. CHP as the party of the urban elite and Alevi population: 
One of the most striking features of Turkish political arena has been the 
narrowing electoral base of social democrat parties. ChP seems to have 
strong popular base only among the well-educated urban groups and in 
areas where Alevi population live. 
6. First signs of strange bed fellows, CHP and MHP: 
ChP, a party of a member of Socialist International and MhP, nationalist 
right wing party, have been traditional foes, and their popular bases have 
always been thought to have the completely opposite ideological and 
social poles. however, just after AKP took office and started to follow 
post-secular, multi-identity and liberal politics, those foes have gradually 
built up a friendship on a similar political ground in the face of Kurdish 
question, European Union candidacy, privatization etc. following single 
identity based nationalist and statist politics. As far as urban development 
and economic activity indices are concerned, one can see the early signs of 
such rapprochement in several clusters in Turkey in the 2002 elections. 
7. DEHAP- a truly regional party in every sense: 
DehAP has the strongest positive spatial dependency in the party votes, 
meaning that localities where it is strong tend to be surrounded by 
localities having a similar characteristic. In fact, DehAP does not seem 
to go beyond being a regional party of the Southeast where problem of 
regional disparity and Kurdish ethnic identity has translated into growing 
Kurdish nationalism in the last two decades. The analysis makes it 
clear that DehAP has been unable to reach the Kurds living outside the 
traditional Kurdish region, turning into a truly regional party having very 
little to say to those living in other parts of the country. Another important 
evidence of the fact that DehAP is a truly regional party is the finding 
that all of the significant relationships discovered herein, either positive 
or negative, are peculiar to the region, not observed in any degree in any 
other part of the country. 
In short, such an analysis for the local determinants of party preferences 
shows how geography makes difference in the relationship between the 
voting patterns and social economic factors shedding light on the peculiar 
elections in 2002. Applying the same analysis to the 2007 elections when 
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the AKP’s success in elections actually continued with an increasing trend, 
garnering almost half of the votes from the populace will surely make us 
understand the electoral in specific, political in general transformation that 
Turkey has undergone in the new millennium with a strong mandate of a 
party with deep Islamic roots. Nevertheless, the data limitations do not let 
us to do so since there is no corresponding economic and social data set 
available for the 2007 elections. 
While the country has become more and more urbanized with the influx 
of migrants to cities, it seems that the pivotal focus of interest of right wing 
parties shifted from rural areas to the less educated poor migrants living 
at the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. It seems clearly to be the case 
that AKP found itself an electoral base that is radically different from the 
traditional right-wing and Islamist parties: the urban poor and the nascent 
entrepreneurial classes in the rapidly developing provincial towns. On the 
other hand, the traditional popular base of social-democrat ChP, i.e. the 
educated urban elite, is under increasing threat from the nationalist MhP. 
The extent to which all these balances may be long-lasting in a country 
characterized by wide social and regional inequalities and high rates of 
social and geographical mobility will be determined not only by what is 
likely to happen in Turkey but also by the wider changes in the global 
economy of which Turkey is increasingly a part. 
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HERŞEYİN DEĞİŞTİĞİ YILA GERİ DÖNÜŞ:    
2002 GENEL SEÇİMLERİNDE PARTİ TERCİHLERİNİ YEREL 
DÜZEYDE BELİRLEYEN ETMENLER
İslami eğilimleri olan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin (AKP) 2002 
seçimlerini kazanarak iktidara gelmesi ile birlikte Türkiye siyasetinde 
çok önemli bir değişim yaşandı. Seçimler Türkiye siyasetini derinden 
belirleyen “tsunami” etkisi yaratmış olsa da, Türkiye seçim coğrafyasında 
ortaya çıkan farklılaşmaların ne denli kalıcı olduğunu bir kez daha gözler 
önüne serdi. Coğrafi ağırlıklandırılmış regresyon olarak bilinen bir teknik 
yardımıyla bu yazıda, Türkiye’deki eşitsiz seçim coğrafyasının ardında 
yatan nedenler araştırılmaktadır. elde edilen sonuçlar Türkiye siyaset 
sahnesinin iki temel aktörü olan AKP ve ChP’nin oy düzeyini belirleyen 
yerel etmenler açısından belirgin bir karşıtlık içinde olduklarını ortaya 
koymaktadır. AKP’nin, geleneksel sağ partilerin tersine, kent yoksulları ile 
Anadolu’nun hızla gelişen bölgelerinde kendine bir taban bulmuş olmasına 
karşın, sosyal demokrat ChP büyük ölçüde kentli seçkin kesimlerle kısıtlı 
kalmış görünmektedir. Bu bulgu, çoğu araştırmacı tarafından Türkiye 
siyasetinin en belirgin özelliklerinden biri olarak görülen “merkez-çevre” 
ayrımının yeni bir görüntüsü olarak ele alınmalıdır.
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